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Abstract
Applications of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are growing tremendously
in the domains of habitat, tele-health, industry monitoring, vehicular net-
works, home automation and agriculture. This trend is a strong motivation for
malicious users to increase their focus on WSNs and to develop and initiate
security attacks that disturb the normal functioning of the network in a severe
manner. Such attacks affect the performance of the network by increasing the
energy consumption, by reducing throughput and by inducing long delays.
Of all existing WSN attacks, MAC layer attacks are considered the most
harmful as they directly affect the available resources and thus the nodes’
energy consumption.
The first endeavour of this paper is to model the activities of MAC layer
security attacks to understand the flow of activities taking place when mount-
ing the attack and when actually executing it. The second aim of the paper is
to simulate these attacks on hybrid MAC mechanisms, which shows the per-
formance degradation of a WSN under the considered attacks. The modelling
and implementation of the security attacks give an actual view of the network
which can be useful in further investigating secure mechanisms to reduce the
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degradation of the performance in WSNs due to an attack. Lastly, the paper
proposes some solutions to reduce the effects of an attack.
Keywords: wireless sensor networks (WSNs), media access control (MAC),
activity modelling, security attacks.
1 Introduction
A WSN consists of small sensor nodes, each one equipped with limited bat-
tery, a microprocessor, a small amount of memory and a transducer. WSNs
are versatile networks with a very wide domain of applications and their
resource-constrained nature is an important research challenge. Like all other
networks, WSN resources are mainly affected by the MAC layer and MAC
layer protocols play an important role in resource utilisation, network delays,
scalability and energy consumption [1].
Due to the rise of many mission critical WSN applications, another great
challenge is security. The range and number of security attacks in WSNs have
increased significantly over the last decade [2] and it is therefore necessary to
design WSNs and related protocols also considering constraints with respect
to security. Attacks can happen at all layer of a WSN but are more harmful
when they are in the form of resource consumption attacks. Resource con-
sumption attacks mainly take place at the MAC layer because this is the layer
that controls the access to the resources in the network.
This paper focuses on denial of service MAC layer attacks in WSNs.
Denial of service attacks in WSNs are primarily affecting the sleep mode
of WSN nodes, which is often referred to as denial of sleep. During sleep
mode, the nodes save energy by keeping the radio off and denial of sleep
attacks prevent nodes from going into this mode, which increases the energy
consumption and also reduces the total network lifetime [3, 4].
The objectives of this paper are to analyse the activities taking place in
order to carry out the attack, to investigate how the attack can be implemented
and to propose a solution that can reduce the effects of the attacks. The attacks
are modelled using activity modelling, which is an efficient tool to understand
the flow of activities during the implementation of the tasks. The attacks are
implemented using the tool Network Simulator 2 (NS-2) considering hybrid
MAC mechanisms [5] and the results show the actual performance degrad-
ation due to the attacks. The results are useful for proposing secure hybrid
WSN MAC mechanisms and the paper proposes a novel solution that reduces
the effect of a specific attack.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives an
overview of MAC layer denial of service/sleep attacks. Section 3 presents the
activity modelling of security attacks. Section 4 discusses the simulation of
security attacks and the results obtained and Section 5 explains the proposed
solutions to reduce the effect of the attacks. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper with future work.
2 MAC Layer Security Attacks
2.1 Collision Attack
The malicious collision attack [6, 7] can be easily launched by a comprom-
ised sensor node, which does not follow the MAC protocol rules and thereby
causes collisions with neighbouring nodes’ transmissions by sending short
noise packets. This can cause a lot of disruptions to the network operation
and will lead to retransmissions and wasted energy. The attack does not con-
sume much energy of the attacker and it is difficult to detect because of the
broadcast nature of the wireless environment.
2.2 Unintelligent Replay Attack
In case of the unintelligent replay attack [3], the attacker does not have MAC
protocol knowledge and no ability to penetrate the network. Here, recorded
events are replayed into the network which prevent nodes from entering sleep
mode and lead to waste in energy in receiving and processing the extra pack-
ets. If nodes are not equipped with an anti-replay mechanism, this attack
causes the replayed traffic to be forwarded through the network, consuming
energy at each relaying node on the path to the destination. The replaying of
events has adverse effect on the network lifetime and overall performance of
a WSN.
2.3 Unauthenticated Broadcast Attack
In an unauthenticated broadcast attack [3], the attacker has full knowledge of
the MAC protocol but does not have the capability to penetrate the network.
Here, the attacker broadcasts unauthenticated traffic into the network by fol-
lowing all MAC rules and this disrupts the normal sleep and listen cycle of the
node and places most of the nodes in listen mode for an extended amount of
time, which leads to increased energy consumption and reduction in network
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lifetime. Such attacks cause severe harm on MAC protocols by producing
short control or data messages and have short adaptive timeout period.
2.4 Full Domination Attack
Here, the attacker has full knowledge of the MAC layer protocol and has
the ability to penetrate the network. This type of attack is one of the most
destructive to a WSN as the attacker has the ability to produce trusted traffic
to gain the maximum possible impact from denial of sleep. This attack is
carried out using one or more compromised nodes in the network and all
MAC layer protocols are vulnerable to this kind of attack [3].
2.5 Exhaustion Attack
The attacker who commences an exhaustion attack [3] has knowledge about
the MAC protocol and the ability to penetrate the network. These attacks
are possible only in case of request to send (RTS)/clear to send (CTS) based
MAC protocols. In this attack, the malicious node sends RTS to a node and
if the node replies with CTS, the malicious node will repeatedly transmit the
RTS to the node, which will prevent the node from going into sleep mode and
instead drain the energy of the node. This attack is affecting the node lifetime
and can partition the network, which lead to reduced network lifetime.
2.6 Intelligent Jamming Attack
The intelligent jamming attack is one of the most severe attacks and in this
attack the attacker has full protocol knowledge but does not have the ability to
penetrate the network. The attacker injects unauthenticated unicast and broad-
cast packets into the network. These attacks can differentiate between control
and data traffic and unlike the unauthenticated replay attack it selectively
replays the data or control packets [3, 8].
3 Activity Modelling of MAC Security Attacks
3.1 Activity Modelling
Activity diagrams are often used to give a functional view of a system as
it describes logical processes, or functions, where each process describes
a sequence of tasks and the decisions that govern when and how they are
performed. UML [9–11] is a tool that provides functional modelling in the
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Figure 1 Activity modelling of collision attack.
form of an activity diagram, which is designed to support the description of
behaviours that depend upon the results of internal processes, as opposed to
external events as in interaction diagrams. The flow in an activity diagram
is driven by the completion of an action. Activity diagrams are useful tools
to understand the basic flow of security attacks and will be utilised in the
following to do so.
3.2 Activity Modelling of Security Attacks
For all of the presented attacks, the external attacker will have to initiate an
attack by utilising an exploit on a vulnerable normal node to turn it into a
malicious node. If the attacker succeeds in initiating the attack the normal
node becomes malicious and otherwise it continues to operate as a normal
node.
 
 
 
 
 
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
F 
6 P.M. Pawar et al.
3.2.1 Collision Attack
Figure 1 shows the activity diagram for the collision attack and the different
activities are as follows:
• The malicious node randomly creates noise packets and transmits them
into the network.
• A normal node starts a transmission to the sink either by direct commu-
nication or through relays using multi-hop communication.
• A collision happens between the control or data packet from the nor-
mal node and the noise packet from the malicious node. Repeatedly
collisions will reduce the performance of the network.
3.2.2 Unintelligent Replay Attack
The sequence of activities in case of an unintelligent replay attack is shown
in Figure 2 and are as follows:
• The normal node has data to send and checks if the channel is available
and, if it is, the node starts the transmission.
• The malicious node records the transmission as if in normal node mode,
which it keeps replaying unintelligently, i.e. without making differenti-
ation between data and control packets; it will replay any transmission
the normal node would have generated.
• The malicious node checks the remaining energy on each replay and
once the energy is exhausted, the attack will be terminated and the
external attacker will try to initiate the attack on another node.
3.2.3 Unauthenticated Broadcast Attack
Figure 3 shows the activity modelling of the unauthenticated broadcast attack.
The sequence of activities performed by the normal and malicious node is as
follows:
• The normal node does communication as in the previous attack.
• The malicious node uses similar transmissions, but broadcasts the packet
to all nodes in the network and, further, tries to authenticate itself, which
fails.
• If the broadcast takes place during transmission of a normal node a
collision will take place. These collisions and the failed attempt to au-
thenticate lead to performance degradation and thereby excessive energy
consumption.
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Figure 2 Activity modelling of unintelligent replay attack.
3.2.4 Full Domination Attack
The modelling of the sequence of activities for the full domination attack can
be seen from Figure 4 and activities are as follows:
• The normal node broadcasts a packet into network, if the channel is
available.
 
 
 
 
 
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
F 
8 P.M. Pawar et al.
Figure 3 Activity modelling of unauthorised broadcast attack.
• The malicious node does the same and tries for authentication. As the
attacker has full network knowledge, the authentication is successful
and the malicious packet is transmitted while the malicious node tries
to introduce collisions during normal traffic.
• The malicious node can also replay the communications unintelligently
and broadcast it until the node’s energy is exhausted. The full dom-
ination attack reduces the efficiency of the network by introducing
authenticated broadcast and by replaying transmissions.
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Figure 4 Activity modelling of full domination attack.
3.2.5 Exhaustion Attack
Figure 5 explains the sequence of activities during an exhaustion attack and
the sequence of activities can be explained as follows:
• The normal node can send RTS, receive CTS from destination and send
data towards the destination node.
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Figure 5 Activity modelling of exhaustion attack.
• In case of the malicious node, it sends RTS and waits for CTS from the
destination node. If it receives the CTS, it will send the RTS repeatedly
towards the destination node until its energy is exhausted.
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Figure 6 Activity modelling of intelligent jamming attack.
3.2.6 Intelligent Jamming Attack
Figure 6 shows the sequence of activities that happen during an intelligent
jamming attack and the activities are as follows:
• The normal node has data to send and broadcasts it if the channel is
available.
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• The malicious node does the same, authenticates to the node and
broadcasts the packet in the way as for the full domination attack.
• The most important feature of the intelligent jamming attack is its intel-
ligent behaviour. It can differentiate between data and control packets,
and will selectively replay the event until the node energy is exhausted.
• The replaying of event and broadcast of authenticated packet lead to
collisions during normal transmissions.
4 Simulation of Security Attacks on Hybrid WSN MAC
4.1 Simulation Details
All simulations are carried out using the discrete event simulator NS-2 and
the simulation parameters are shown in Table 1. The idle power, receiving
power, transmission power and sleep power are considered according to the
RFM TR 3000 transceiver. The simulations are performed using the hybrid
MAC mechanism Zebra-MAC (ZMAC) [11] and the simulated scenarios are:
• ZMAC without any attacks.
• ZMAC under unintelligent replay attack.
• ZMAC under unintelligent broadcast attack.
• ZMAC under exhaustion attack.
• ZMAC under collision attack.
• ZMAC under full domination attack.
• ZMAC under intelligent jamming attack.
The simulations are carried out under the assumption that the attacker can
initiate the attack from multiple nodes. The initial simulation is done using
four malicious nodes, but the impact of varying malicious nodes (2–32) is
also investigated.
4.2 Results and Discussion
Figures 7–9 3 show the performance, i.e. energy consumption, throughput
and delay of ZMAC, a hybrid MAC mechanism, under normal conditions and
under attacks. The figures show that the performance of the WSN degrades
with the attacks and the reasons for the performance degradations under the
individual attacks are as follows:
• Unauthenticated Broadcast Attack: The performance degradation due
to this attack is less compared to the other attacks because this attack
utilises more energy and requires extra time for authentication of the
 
 
 
 
 
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
F 
Activity Modelling and Comparative Evaluation of WSN MAC Security Attacks 13
Figure 7 (a) Energy consumption vs. packet interval. (b) Energy consumption vs. number of
malicious nodes.
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Figure 8 (a) Throughput vs. packet interval. (b) Throughput vs. number of malicious nodes.
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Figure 9 (a) Delay vs. packet interval. (b) Delay vs. number of malicious nodes.
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Table 1 Simulation and node parameters.
Parameter Name Setting Used
Wireless Physical
Network Interface Type Wireless Physical
Radio Propagation Model Two-Ray Ground
Antenna Type Omni-directional antenna
Channel Type Wireless Channel
Link Layer
Interface Queue Priority Queue
Buffer Size of IFq 50
MAC Z-MAC
Routing Protocol Ad hoc Routing
Energy Model
Initial Energy (initialEnergy ) 100 J
Idle Power (idlePower ) 14.4 mW
Receiving Power (rxPower ) 14.4 mW
Transmission Power (txPower ) 36.0 mW
Node Placement
Number of Nodes 100
Node Placement Random
broadcast packets coming from the malicious nodes. The attack results
in degradation of the total throughput of the network due to an increased
number of collisions caused by the unauthenticated packets and the
following retransmission of packets from trusted nodes.
• Unintelligent Replay Attack: The performance degradation due to this
attack is more severe than for the unauthenticated broadcast attack be-
cause this attack increases the energy consumption by replaying data
or control packets and thereby wastes energy. A significant increase in
delay can be observed because the node checks for energy at each replay
and also requires additional time to carry out the replay. This unneces-
sary replay keeps the channel busy, which may introduce collisions and
prevent transmission of other packets, which results in degradation of the
total throughput of the network. The attack has more severe performance
degradation than the unintelligent replay attack because it can take place
in any situations, i.e. (i) no protocol knowledge, no ability to penetrate,
(ii) full protocol knowledge, no ability to penetrate, and (iii) full protocol
knowledge, network penetrated.
• Exhaustion Attack: The most adverse effect of this attack is that it totally
blocks the transmission towards one particular node and blocks this node
until its energy is depleted or the network becomes partitioned.
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• Collision Attack: The noise packets introduced by this attack result in
significant performance degradation due to the increased number of col-
lisions in the network. The collisions result in performance degradation
by (i) blocking the channel, (ii) increasing the retransmission of packets,
(iii) introducing delays, and (iv) reducing the chances of packets to reach
their destination. The effect of collisions is adverse as the traffic load
increases.
• Full Domination Attack: This attack is a combination of the previously
two attacks and therefore has more adverse effects. The results shows
that energy, throughput and delay degradation is much increased com-
pared to the previous attacks as this attack increases the delay and energy
by repeatedly broadcasting packets which makes the channel constantly
busy, so it will not be available other nodes to transmit and it also reduces
the throughput by not giving the chance to new packets to be transmitted
through the network. As for the exhaustion attack, it also partition the
network but much faster.
• Intelligent Jamming Attack: This is the most disastrous of the considered
attacks because it works intelligently by selectively retransmitting data
and control packets. It requires in-depth knowledge of the protocols used
in the network. The results show that the performance degradation of
this attack is slightly more severe than the full domination attack as this
attack cannot intelligently retransmit.
5 Proposed Solutions
The implementation shows the adverse effect on the network of the listed
WSN MAC layer attacks. The attacks degrade the performance of the WSN
with 50% or more and to reduce these effects some possible solutions are
• Cluster-based MAC protocol: Cluster-based MAC protocols improve the
scalability of the network by stabilising the network topology at the
level of sensors and thus lower the topology maintenance overhead. The
clustering can also reduce the number of required slots by increasing the
reuse of slots that, in turn, can reduce the amount of delay in commu-
nication. One important advantage offered by cluster-based protocols is
their inherent security, as an attack on a cluster based MAC protocols
will be bound to that particular cluster and not affect the whole network.
This automatically reduces the overall impact of the attack on the total
performance of the WSN.
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• Secure slot assignment: Secure slot assignment assumes that some slots
are secure and are given only to nodes that are transmitting sensitive
information. Nodes with secure slots assigned can start communication
with another node by checking the identity of the node to determine if it
is secure to communicate or not. This will help to reduce the influence of
MAC security attacks in terms of reducing energy consumption, delay
and increasing throughput.
6 Conclusion
The activity modelling of WSNs MAC layer security attacks gives a detailed
view of activities executed during mounting of the attacks, which is essen-
tial knowledge for proposing more efficient security mechanisms that can
withstand the attacks. The paper also provides simulation results of security
attacks on a hybrid MAC mechanism and the results show the trend of net-
work degradation due to the security attacks under varying traffic and number
of malicious nodes. Intelligent jamming attacks pose the greatest threat to a
WSN because of its intelligent nature, i.e. the attacker has full knowledge
of the protocols used, it can easily differentiate between control and data
packets and it can penetrate the network. The simulation results in general
give a strong motivation and modelling framework for further investigating
efficient and secure MAC protocols for WSN.
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